How does your organization define thresholds at which severe risks, unless adequately mitigated, may be considered "unreasonable"? Please describe the framework(s) most relevant to your organization's role and context. If your organisation does not use formal thresholds, you may describe instead the policies, decision criteria, or governance processes you apply when assessing severe AI risks. You may also describe:
• Specific examples of contexts in which your models or systems could, in your assessment, pose unreasonable or intolerable risk;
• How mitigations are graduated by capability or propensity level;
• How your organisation considers the specificities of different AI technologies, such as generative AI and agentic AI, including any specific risk assessment or governance mechanisms applied to agentic AI capabilities.
As an application developer and deployer, MGOIT does not train frontier models and therefore does not operate formal capability-based risk thresholds. Instead, we apply decision criteria and governance processes at the project and system level to determine when an AI risk would be unreasonable:
(1) Use-case gating at scoping. Before development begins, each AI feature is assessed against the EU AI Act risk classification and our internal criteria. We consider risk unreasonable — and decline or redesign the use case — when an AI system would make fully automated decisions with significant impact on individuals (e.g. financial, employment, or safety-relevant outcomes) without meaningful human review, or when the client's data governance cannot support the required level of data protection.
(2) Human-in-the-loop as a graduated mitigation. Mitigations scale with impact: low-stakes outputs (e.g. document drafting, information retrieval) ship with user-facing review; higher-impact outputs (e.g. financial calculations, offers, compliance-relevant content) require explicit human approval before any downstream effect. Edge cases detected in testing are routed to mandatory human review paths.
(3) Pre-deployment testing in secure environments. AI features are tested in isolated environments with anonymised or synthetic data before production exposure, including adversarial and edge-case testing for bias and incorrect outputs.
(4) Agentic AI specifics. Where we build agentic capabilities (multi-step workflows, tool use, integrations), agents operate under scoped permissions: restricted tool access, no autonomous write-access to production systems of record without an approval gate, full action logging for auditability, and rollback paths. Autonomy level is treated as a risk dimension in itself — broader autonomy requires stricter approval gates and monitoring.
(5) Escalation and stop criteria. If testing or production monitoring reveals behaviour that cannot be mitigated to an acceptable level (persistent hallucination in a high-impact path, unmitigable bias, data leakage risk), the feature is withheld or rolled back until redesigned. This decision sits with the technical leadership (CTO and technical leads), not with delivery deadlines.